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Abstract
This paper examines the protability of horizontal merger in an open
economy with Cournot competition. We nd that duopoly is a necessary,
but not su¢ cient, condition for domestic merger to be protable. A cross-
border merger, however, can be protable from any market structure.
JEL classication: L4, F2
Keywords: merger, international trade, oligopoly.
1 Introduction
In an important contribution to the literature on incentives for rms to merge,
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) establish that a bilateral merger from an
initial Cournot equilibrium with linear demand is unprotable, except in the
case of duopoly. One strand of subsequent research has explored conditions
that might augment the protability of merger, such as the existence of cost
savings (Perry and Porter, 1985), product di¤erentiation advantages (Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985) or more complex (non-linear) demand functions (Cheung,
1992 and Faulí-Oller, 1997). In this paper we revert to Salant, Switzer and
Reynoldss constant cost, homogeneous product, linear demand framework to
examine the protability of merger in an open economy. More specically, we
ask: for what congurations of market structure and trade costs, if any, will
merger be protable? Using a two-country model, we consider both within-
country (domestic) and cross-border (international) mergers. We nd that,
under trade conditions, duopoly is a necessary, but no longer su¢ cient, condition
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.
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for protable domestic merger, but international merger can be protable from
any market structure.1
2 The Model
We consider a homogeneous product which can be produced and consumed in
either, or both, of two countries, i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:We suppose that each country
has an identical linear inverse demand function
Pi = a Qi: (1)
Production costs comprise a constant marginal cost which is the same for
all rms and, for simplicity, set to zero. In addition, exports are subject to
a trade cost, t, per unit of output. We let ni and nj denote the number of
rms located in countries i and j respectively. We assume that the outcome of
competition between rms is a Cournot equilibrium in quantities and that there
is no arbitrage. This implies that the price prevailing in country i can di¤er
from that in country j by more than t. Prots for a representative rm based
in country i are given by
i = Piyi + (Pj   t)xi; (2)
where yi denotes the sales of a rm in country i to its home market and xi its
exports to country j.
The problem of a representative rm in country i is to maximise (2), hold-
ing outputs of rival rms xed and subject to non-negativity constraints on
xi and yi. We assume, henceforth, that dom stic output is strictly positive in
equilibrium. The rst order conditions, using an asterisk to denote Cournot
equilibrium values, for this problem are
P i   yi = 0 (3)
and
P j   t  xi  0
xi  0

; (4)
where a right hand brace indicates a pair of complementary inequalities, one of
which must hold with equality.
Noting that P i is a function of y

i and x

j alone, whilst P

j is a function of
yj and x

i alone, conditions (3) and (4) can be solved simultaneously to yield
xi (ni; nj) = max

0;
a  (nj + 1)t
ni + nj + 1

(5)
and
1A related, but di¤erent, issue is the change in the protability of merger that would result
from a change in trade cost or unilateral tari¤. This question has been examined by Long
and Vousden (1995), Falvey (1998) and Gaudet and Kanouni (2004).
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yi (ni; nj) = (a+ njt)=(ni + nj + 1), x

j (ni;nj) > 0;
yi (ni; nj) = a=(ni + 1); x

j (ni;nj) = 0:
(6)
In the case where exports from both countries are zero, (5) - (6) reduce to
the standard conditions for Cournot equilibrium in each country in which rms
make prots of
Ai (ni) =

a
ni + 1
2
: (7)
By inspection of (5), the maximum trade cost compatible with international
trade taking place (i.e. xi ; x

j > 0) is given by
t < max

a
ni + 1
;
a
nj + 1

 t (8)
and for the symmetric case where ni = nj = n this threshold level of trade
cost is
t =
a
n+ 1
: (9)
For an equilibrium involving trade, substitution from (5) and (6) into (1)
and (2), after some rearrangement, yields:
i (ni; nj ; t) =

2a2 + 2n2j t
2   2anjt2 + t2

ni + nj + 1
: (10)
It is convenient to decompose this prot into the elements deriving from the
home and overseas markets. For a rm located in country i, we denote these
prots as ii(ni; nj ; t) and 
j
i (ni; nj ; t) respectively and note that i(ni; nj ; t) 
ii(ni; nj ; t) + 
j
i (ni; nj ; t): Substitution from (5) and (6) into (1) yields
ii(ni; nj ; t) =

a+ njt
ni + nj + 1
2
(11)
and
ji (ni; nj ; t) =

a  (nj + 1)t
ni + nj + 1
2
: (12)
Similarly for a rm in country j; j(ni; nj ; t)  jj(ni; nj ; t)+ij(ni; nj ; t); where
jj(ni; nj ; t) =

a+ nit
ni + nj + 1
2
(13)
and
ij(ni; nj ; t) =

a  (ni + 1)t
ni + nj + 1
2
: (14)
3
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2.1 Merger under Trade
We consider rst an initial equilibrium with trade taking place and consider
two possible forms of merger. In what we term a domestic merger two rms in
country i form a single rm and in what we term an international merger one
rm in country i joins with one rm in country j:
With a domestic merger two rms forgo their individual prots i(ni; nj ; t)
but take a share of prots that are enhanced through the reduction in domestic
competition. Thus, the gain to a domestic merger in a trade equilibrium in
which ni = nj = n, can be written as
GD(n; t) = ii(ni 1; nj ; t)+ji (ni 1; nj ; t) 2ii(ni; nj ; t) 2ji (ni; nj ; t): (15)
With an international merger, we need to consider three types of rms. Follow-
ing such a merger there will be n   1 rms located wholly in country i, n   1
rms located in country j and one newly merged rm which has a production
base in each country. The newly merged rm is not the same as existing rms
in that it can supply either market from a domestic production unit. Therefore,
in setting its output in each country it can act like a domestic rm in that
country; there is no incentiv for it to produce for export because by producing
domestically it can save trade costs. The multinational rms impact on total
production can therefore be deduced by analogy with a Cournot equilibrium in
which domestic output in country i is determined as if there are n domestic
Cournot competitors and n   1 overseas competitors, whilst output for export
from country i is determined as if there are n  1 rms competing over exports
facing n overseas competitors. The position in country j is symmetric to this.
International merger, therefore, has the e¤ect of reducing by one the number
of exporters serving each market but leaving the number of domestic producers
unchanged. Thus, the gain to an international merger in a trade equilibrium in
which ni = nj = n, can be written as
GI(n; t) = ii(ni; nj   1; t)+jj(ni  1; nj ; t) i(ni; nj ; t) j(ni; nj ; t): (16)
In their autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrate
that a merger is protable only if there are two rms in the initial Cournot
equilibrium. Does this result hold under trade? A rst thought might be that
merger would clearly be unprotable since the number of competitors is doubled
relative to the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds setting. However, the situation
under trade is complicated by the fact that merger generates an asymmetry
between the merged and unmerged entities. Proposition 1 addresses the question
in regard to domestic and international merger.
Proposition 1 For domestic merger, GD(n; t) < 0 for all n and 0  t < t
whilst for international merger there exists a threshold level of trade costs, btI(n)
such that GI(n; t) < 0 when t < btI(n), but GI(n; t) > 0 when btI(n) < t < t
Proof. Setting ni = nj = n, substituting from (11) and (12) into GD(n; t)
and di¤erentiating with resect to t the resulting rst order condition implies
4
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that GD(n; t) is maximised at a trade cost of t(n) = a2n2+2n+1 . Substitution
of this value of t into GD(n; t) shows that the latter is negative for n  2
thus establishing the result for domestic merger. After setting ni = nj = n,
substituting from (11) and (12) into GI(n; t) and equating to zero, the critical
(zero-gain) value of trade cost can be solved for as btI(n) = 8an3 10an 2a2(4n4+12n3+7n2 2n 1) :
For all n  2, btI(n) lies in the range (0; t): Since, as can readily be conrmed,
GI(n; t) is negative at t = 0, concave and approaches zero from above as t
approaches t it follows that btI(n) constitutes a threshold such that GI(n; t) < 0
when t < btI(n), but G1(n; t) > 0 when btI(n) < t < t, thus conrming the result
for international merger.
The Proposition establishes that from an initial equilibrium in which there is
international trade then, whatever the market structure, there is no incentive for
domestic merger. However, with an international merger the situation is some-
what di¤erent. Specically, Proposition 1 admits the possibility that mergers
from even relatively competitive markets may be protable provided that trade
costs are of an appropriate magnitude. The intuition for this di¤erence can be
explained in terms of the impact of merger on cost and revenue. For t = 0,
domestic and international mergers are equivalent; neither generates a saving in
trade cost whilst both lead to a fall in market share and revenue (the standard
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds result). Now consider the e¤ect of raising t. Both
domestic and international mergers will generate a saving in trade costs, but
the reduction will be greater in the latter case since both markets will be served
from a domestic plant. For both types of merger the relationship between t and
the trade cost saving is non-monotonic, falling to zero as t approaches t, the
point at which trade ceases. The impact of t on the consequences of merger for
revenue is markedly di¤erent in the two cases: for a domestic merger the loss of
revenue increases with t whilst for an international merger there is an inverse
relationship. This di¤erence can be understood by considering the situation as
t approaches t. In the case of domestic merger the e¤ect becomes concentrated
on the home market to the point where, when t = t, the impact of the merger
is simply to reduce the number of domestic competitors from n to n   1, with
the associated loss of market share for the merging entities. With an interna-
tional merger, by contrast, there is no loss of market share at t = t since the
number of competitors remains at n in both markets. The net result is that for
an international merger the cost saving will outweigh the loss of revenue if t is
su¢ ciently high, whilst a domestic merger is always unprotable.
The following gure (in which a = 1) shows how the protability of an
international merger is related to trade cost and initial market concentration;
an international merger is protable between the locus t and the locus btI .
2.2 Merger Initiating Trade
When a merger takes place from autarky (i.e. t > t) the resulting change in
market structure may initiate trade. To understand this e¤ect, let Xi and X

j
denote the total volume of exports from i to j and j to i respectively. Using (5)
5
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for the representative rm in i; and an equivalent expression for that in j, these
are given by
Xi (ni; nj ; t) =
ni(a  t(nj + 1))
ni + nj + 1
(17)
and
Xj (ni; nj ; t) =
nj(a  t(ni + 1))
ni + nj + 1
: (18)
With a symmetric initial structure with n rms in each country, the ows
of exports from i to j and j to i following a domestic merger in country i are,
respectively,
XDi (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

(19)
and
XDj (n; t) = max

0;
a  nt
2

: (20)
Inspection of (19) and (20) reveals that the former is positive for t < t
whilst the latter is positive for t < tA where
tA  a
n
: (21)
Thus, if t lies in the range t < t < tA a domestic merger in country i will
initiate a one-way ow of trade from j to i.
Consider now an international merger. As explained above, this has the
e¤ect of reducing by one the number of exporters serving each market but
leaving the number of domestic producers unchanged. Assuming a symmetric
initial structure with n rms in each country and using, (17) and (18), we can
write the post-merger trade ows as
XIi (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

(22)
and
XIj (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

: (23)
For either of these ows to be positive requires t < t, which is the same
condition that pertained pre-merger. An international merger will thus neither
initiate, nor cause the cessation of, trading.
We may thus consider whether from a position of autarky, but where t < tA,
a domestic merger is protable. The gain from such a merger is
GDA(n; t) = ii(ni   1; nj ; t)  2A(ni) (24)
6
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and, in rather special circumstances, this may be positive as the following Propo-
sition establishes.
Proposition 2 For n = 2 there exists a threshold level of trade costs, btD,
such that GDA(n; t) > 0 when btD < t < tA(n): In all other circumstances,
GDA(n; t) < 0.
Proof.
After setting ni = nj = n, substituting from (11) and (7) into GDA(n; t)
reveals directly that this is negative for n > 2: Setting n = 2 and solving
GDA(n; t) = 0 for t yields a critical (zero-gain) value for trade cost of btD =
a(4
p
2 3)
6 : Since G
DA(n; t) is increasing in t it follows that for btD < t < tA(n) it
is positive, thus establishing the claim.
The Proposition demonstrates that for trade costs in the range where a
domestic merger would initiate trade, duopoly in the home market is a necessary
but not su¢ cient condition for the merger to be protable. This contrasts to the
position under autarky where, as established by Salant Switzer and Reynolds,
a bilateral merger from duopoly is always protable.
3 Conclusions
In an autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrated that
a merger would be protable if there were two rms in the initial Cournot equi-
librium, but not if there were three or more rms. Using a two-country model,
we show that in an open economy with international trade, the condition for a
merger between two rms in the same country to be protable is more restric-
tive. Specically, duopoly is no longer su¢ cient for a merger to be protable;
an additional requirement is that trade costs exceed a threshold level. An in-
ternational merger, by contrast, can be protable from any market structure,
provided that trade costs lie in a certain range. For simplicity, it has been as-
sumed that both market size and initial market structure are the same in both
countries, and one direction for further research is to consider an asymmetric
setting.
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